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The Harmony of Time in Paradise Lost
Robert Kellogg
In the fi rst terrible misery following God’s judgment on him, 
Adam longed for death. Nor could he understand the delay in carrying 
out the sentence. The conditions had been clear enough: “In the day 
thou eat’st, thou diest” (7.544).1 “Why delays,” he asked himself,
His hand to execute what his decree
Fixed on this day? Why do I overlive,
Why am I mocked with death, and lengthened out
To deathless pain? (10.771-75)
Adam’s confusion is in some measure resolved by the time he comes to 
talk with Eve. He tells her that
. . . this day’s death denounced, if aught I see,
Will prove no sudden, but a slow-paced evil,
A long day’s dying to augment our pain,
And to our seed (O hapless seed!) derived. (10.962-65) 
Because we readers of Paradise Lost are at home in this fallen human 
world, it can be instructive for us to imagine how it must fi rst have 
impinged on Adam, as the strange consequences of his crime and his 
punishment were borne in on him. We discover that the poem’s theological 
doctrine is a key not only to its meaning but to its narrative art as well. 
A consequence of the fall for Adam was his heightened awareness of 
duration and change, memory and anticipation—in other words, of a 
plot unfolding in time. From the almost timeless simultaneity of the 
heavenly aevum, Adam is expelled into a world of time, of history and 
story. The judgment of God is, he discovers, to be worked out in time, 
both the sentence of death and the promise of redemption. Eventually 
time will have a stop, Paradise will eventually be regained; this future 
hope is consolation for the dreadful sorrow that memory of his past 
happiness brings on him. But an
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important human virtue in this new world of change becomes endurance, 
enlightened and made possible by memory and hope.
Except for the forbidden tree itself, everything in Eden was what 
it appeared to be. Sign and signifi ed were the same. Except for the tree, 
the things that looked good and tasted good and felt good were good. 
The literalness with which Adam could understand language and his 
experience in Eden is no longer appropriate after the fall. He must learn 
new ways to interpret the laws and purpose of God, including both his 
own sentence to death and God’s judgment on Satan: that Adam’s progeny 
will bruise his head and that the serpent will bruise the heel of Adam’s 
seed. The angel Michael, in describing the enmity between Christ and 
Satan, warns Adam not to be too literal in his understanding:
Dream not of their fi ght,
As of a duel, or the local wound
Of head or heel. (12.385-87)
In the visions of stories revealed by Michael, Adam learns that 
the history into which he has fallen is a multiplicity of cultural forms, 
whose true signifi cance bears only a metaphorical relationship to their 
appearance. Michael’s instruction in hermeneutics is also intended 
to instruct the reader. Before the fall Adam’s intellectual ability was 
impressive, in our terms superhuman. It is evident in Adam’s naming 
the animals and his understanding of their language. And with his 
prelapsarian wisdom came control and command. But after the fall 
that ancient language was lost. How this fall into metaphor, history, and 
cultural variety affects the aesthetics of Paradise Lost can be illustrated 
at the outset.
In Book I the poet asks his muse to say the names of the fallen 
angels who roused themselves at Satan’s summons from their nine-day’s 
slumber. He tells us fi rst that their true, original names have been blotted 
out of heavenly records. So the muse must list them instead by the names 
they took on later, as false deities throughout the heathen world. The 
effect of the catalog that follows, which contains little thumbnail stories 
of the heathen gods, is to blend history and myth, to suggest a whole 
world of story in which the worst results of the fall appear as mythic and 
historical images of sin.
The time of Milton’s main story —the plot of which moves here 
with glacial slowness —is before the creation of the world.
262 ROBERT KELLOGG
The time, however, of the names and stories in the catalog of devils 
disguised as gods is between the fall of Adam and the birth of Christ, 
still the ancient past. In a simile that introduces them, the alien angels 
are likened in numerousness to the barbarian Goths, who poured from 
the populous north in Christian times:
A multitude, like which the populous North
Poured never from her frozen loins, to pass
Rhine or the Danaw, when her barbarous sons
Come like a deluge on the South, and spread
Beneath Gibralter to the Lybian sands. (1.351-55)
This is an example of what I call the harmony of times in 
Paradise Lost. Historical, legendary, mythological fi gures are organized 
and understood in one grand intellectual and poetic scheme. Here the 
idea is introduced into Book I by narrative devices that are themselves 
the relics of an ancient past. The invocation of the muse, the mythical 
and historical similes, and the catalog are all easily recognized features 
of Homeric epic, all made possible, so to speak, or necessary, by history, 
metaphor, and cultural fragmentation—the consequences of Adam’s 
fall. Because it is for me a useful way to approach Milton’s narrative 
art, I want to consider this particular relationship between Homeric 
and Miltonic epic in some detail. I am less interested in the infl uence 
of Homer on Milton than in the degree to which it may be said that 
Paradise Lost and the Homeric epics are “in harmony,” sharing a generic 
feature of epic, despite the great distances that separate them in time and 
culture. Milton’s poem is, I suppose, a special case of the Paradox of the 
Fortunate Fall, another way in which God turns evil into good. Adam 
says, toward the end of the poem in which he is a central character, 
“full of doubt I stand, Whether I should repent me now of sin” (12.473-
74). Not only was his disobedience a necessary condition for the very 
existence of his story; but the great intellectual effort of telling the story 
is, in human and cultural terms, a kind of cure, a compensation for the 
loss of Adam’s wisdom and his fall into history and metaphor.
Except for the Iliad and Odyssey, it is hard to fi nd narrative poems 
that can rightly be called epic pure and simple. There are “secondary” or 
“literary” epics, “romantic epics,” “allegorical epics,” “folk epics,” and 
so on. But by Milton’s time, or even by Virgil’s, the epic as a narrative 
genre had passed into the mists of time. Its relationship to the cultures 
and societies in which it developed and
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fl ourished could not be replicated in succeeding ages of European 
history. The reason for this is that, very strictly speaking, the epic is not 
a literary form at all. It is instead a form of oral narrative.
A fuller account of oral narrative than I can manage might be 
offered by half the contributors to this volume for Father Ong. So I shall 
only mention its three primary characteristics and then discuss one of 
them as a way of seeing a common purpose in the epic of both Homer 
and Milton.
Oral narrative is formulaic, rhythmic, and traditional. Much has 
been written, of course, about the formulaic quality of oral narrative. 
It is what fi rst led Milman Parry and Albert Lord to argue, by analogy 
with formulaic narrative songs in modern oral cultures, that the Homeric 
poems were orally composed. The rhythmic characteristics of oral 
narratives are more subtle and less well understood. Some of them consist 
of gestures, dances, or chanting by the performer. Others leave deeper 
traces in a transcribed text, such as stanzas, refrains, repeated motifs, 
temporal repetitions of all sorts, not only verbal but also thematic and 
imagistic. For its relevance to the epic as Milton understood the genre, it 
is the third characteristic of oral narrative —its traditional nature —that 
deserves some attention.
An oral performer is not an author. He is bound by tradition 
to tell his story the way he and his audience learned it. The quality 
of an oral performance is measured against some hypothetical or 
ideal performance that exists as well in the audience’s mind as in the 
performer’s. Since the performer is not an author, it may not be too 
far-fetched, if it is somewhat fi gurative, to say that the tradition is the 
author. The performer’s allegiance is not to his own experience, to his 
private vision of the truth, or even to his own creative genius as we 
might conceive of such a faculty, but to the tradition. If an analogy with 
literary culture is useful, we might say that the oral performer’s relation 
to tradition is analogous not to an author’s relationship to a text, but 
to a conscientious reader’s. In an oral culture, narrative art exists in 
performance; in a literary culture it exists in readings.
Since there are no authors of oral narrative, there can be no 
ironic disjunction between author and narrator. The performer and his 
audience in an oral culture are entirely taken up with the fi ctional world 
of the story. Except for rare and stereotyped invocations and comments 
on the events of the stories they tell,
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performers of oral narratives do not talk about themselves, nor do they 
attempt to cultivate an intimacy with their audiences by questioning the 
values implicit in their story or the integrity of its hypothetical reality. In 
criticizing the narrative poets of his day, whose works are now entirely 
lost to us, Aristotle raised precisely this objection. In contrast to Homer 
and the dramatists, the later Greek epic poets did not so much imitate 
the speeches and actions of other men as they placed themselves at 
the center of the stage. To get some idea of what Aristotle objected to, 
we might imagine the chatty and ironic literary narrators of Chaucer’s 
Troilus or Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival.
In A Preface to Plato (1963) and subsequent writings, Eric A. 
Havelock has placed the beginning of ancient Greek literary culture, as 
contrasted to oral culture, as late as the last third of the 5th century B.C. 
Writings attributed to an earlier date, and this includes the Homeric epics, 
Greek tragedy, and the archaic lyric, all show signs of oral composition. 
One feature of oral performance in particular may offer an explanation 
of its survival so late into a culture that had access to writing materials. 
In an oral culture there is a clear distinction between two forms of 
discourse. The rhythmic, traditional, formulaic performances worthy of 
being repeated, in some sense preserved and transmitted from generation 
to generation, are distinguished from all other forms of discourse that 
are not rhythmic, traditional, and formulaic. These latter utterances are 
ephemeral and will quickly disappear if they are not put into what, for a 
lack of a better word, we might call traditional “literary” form. In other 
words, a distinction is made between a verbal activity which might be 
called “literature” and verbal activities which are not. They have different 
forms and hence different statuses in the culture. The great event, then, 
that takes place when oral culture gives way to literary culture is that the 
distinction between “literature” and “nonliterature” is lost. A culture and 
an educational system that is based on books instead of on rhythmic, 
formulaic, and traditional oral performances is capable of preserving 
and refi ning verbal activities of every sort. Such a culture is capable 
of producing science, philosophy, history, and all the other forms of 
discourse which in a literate culture we are incapable of distinguishing 
from literature.
The Homeric epics viewed in this light, that is as the products of 
an oral culture before the development of nontraditional literary forms, 
combine a number of aesthetic and intellectual
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impulses which in a literary culture tend to seek separate and often 
antagonistic forms of development. The attack made both by Plato and 
by the early Greek historians on the “lies” perpetuated by Greek oral 
tradition illustrate this point. From the epic poems themselves we get 
some idea of their cultural function. To a surprising extent, for example, 
the adventures of Odysseus are narrated not directly by Homer but by 
Odysseus himself and other characters within the story. The description 
of the blind singer Demodochos in the palace of Alkinoos suggests the 
formal communal function of heroic song in an aristocratic society. The 
manners, values, and experiences of a heroic warrior class are combined 
with history and sacred myth to produce an almost seamless amalgam 
of narrative impulses.
All fi ction attempts to protect itself to some extent from the 
charge that it tells lies. To do so it advances, or so its defenders claim, 
either some higher truth that through the veil of its apparent lies can be 
discovered by the learned adept (generally the way of allegory), or it 
attempts to represent universal truths, not through particular instances 
but through typical ones (generally the way of realism). Aristotle is the 
greatest theoretician in ancient times of this second line of defense. 
Classical allegories, on the other hand, had no single advocate so 
distinguished. Theogenes of Rhegium (c. 525 B.C.) is at best only the 
fi rst of a long, long line.
Aristotle had another tactic for defending fi ction against its 
detractors, an extremely important one. When the poet cannot say 
something that he knows to be true, he should say things that men have 
always thought to be true. While he gives preference to universal truths 
derived from the representation of typical and plausible characters and 
events, he does allow for the perpetuation of tradition, even in a literary 
culture. This Aristotelian license permits traditional stories a place in 
literary epic, no matter how implausible they may be. The sanction was 
buttressed by the Greek allegorists and later by the traditions of Pauline 
typology as refl ected in Books 11 and 12 of Paradise Lost. Virgil, who 
as far as infl uences on Milton go, is a great deal more signifi cant than 
Homer, was the benefi ciary of a combination of strategies such as these, 
which allowed him to perpetuate the mythological and legendary features 
of epic, while at the same time focusing on moral and psychological 
experience far more complex than anything to be found in the Iliad or 
Odyssey.
Erich Auerbach (1953) has done full justice to the surface
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realism of the Homeric epics.2 In comparing the episode of the scar of 
Odysseus to the scriptural story of the sacrifi ce of Isaac, he may have 
been reading the Old Testament through somewhat anachronistic Pauline 
glasses. But his point about the Odyssey is a good one; the lives of the 
characters are out in the open for us to see. Even the interior monologs 
are not an attempt to represent inarticulate spiritual or psychological 
experience. The great scenes are communal, either public or domestic, 
as are the great themes. The worlds of the Iliad and the Odyssey are 
in this sense like Adam’s world in Eden. Sign and signifi ed are much 
the same thing. The literal level of the poem, or, by extension, of its 
fi ctional world, has not yet “fallen” into a doubtful relationship to a truer 
meaning. It is not yet a vehicle for some higher tenor. And this is what 
we miss in all later epics —the society of real men, albeit generals and 
princes, in all of its rich detail of manners, technology, and policy. There 
is some of it in the Aeneid to be sure, but none at all in Milton.
Virgil is a bridge from Homer to Milton in another respect 
as well. The narrator of the Homeric epic is not distinguished, even 
potentially, from the author. I have mentioned the reason I believe this to 
be true. But in a literary culture, which produces books with title pages, 
not only are we aware of an author; we also expect him to put his own 
individual stamp on every feature of his work. A distinction between 
author and narrator is not just potential; it is actual. In this matter as in so 
many others, the greatest naturalness conceals the greatest art. Because 
it is diffi cult for us to imagine Virgil’s doing less to create a narrator 
as a character separate from the author, we need not consider this a 
missed opportunity. Almost any characterization of a narrator would 
bring about the charge leveled by Aristotle against the later Greek epic 
poets, namely that they talked about themselves rather than imitating 
the actions of other men. Such developed characterization of a narrator 
would seem, by epic decorum, to be low, ironic, and a deterrent to the 
audience’s full commitment to the world and the value of the story being 
told. How, then, could Virgil meet the demand for an authorial identity 
and yet maintain the diffi dence expected of an epic narrator?
The author of a literary epic cannot depend upon the stereotyped 
response of an oral audience which listens to a familiar traditional 
sound. Because the events in which he is most interested tend to be the 
spiritual, moral, and psychological
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experiences of his hero, hidden to some degree beneath the surface of 
the inherited epic trappings, and because by the time he comes to write 
his epic he has a personal and public authority based on his own literary 
accomplishments to date, Virgil must be and is able to adopt a self-
conscious ethical posture from which to guide his audience’s response 
to essentially ethical situations. This was Virgil’s solution, an extremely 
infl uential one, since it has been followed by every epic poet since his 
time, including Milton.
From Virgil the Renaissance epic poets learned, rather than to 
fashion a created narrator distinct from the creating poet, to speak in 
their own public voices. The model for doing so comes from an oral 
tradition of sorts that fl ourished in both Rome and Renaissance Europe 
—public oratory. Rather than adopt a character in the fi ctional sense, 
the orator adopts a character in the ethical sense, an ethos that is suited 
to his argument and to his audience, one carefully designed to persuade. 
The idealized ethos of the Virgilian narrator provides a model for his 
audience to follow. When he weeps, feels pity, indignation, or fear, they 
respond in like fashion. He is a reliable guide through uncharted realms 
of moral experience, reliable because he does not threaten the fi ctional 
integrity of his story by bringing attention to himself, and reliable also 
because he draws on his public reputation as a poet of proven and 
superior ability.
Returning briefl y to the role of traditional story in literary epic, it 
is safe to say that Milton took a more rigorous view than did any of his 
predecessors. He was ambitious to meet Homeric standards, a complete 
reconciliation, amalgamation, and harmony of tradition and truth. An 
historical setting had since Homer’s time been an epic necessity; but the 
fracturing of the Homeric amalgam of myth and history in subsequent 
Greek culture meant that the modern epic poet had to choose between 
intellectually valid history on one hand and what could be best be called 
only legend on the other. From Virgil onward most epic poets have opted 
for legend; all of the really successful ones have, except for Milton. In 
planning an epic poem he rejected the legends of Arthur for exactly 
this reason—they were not true. Instead, he chose the only story that 
was both traditional and true, both mythical and historical: the revolt of 
Satan, the creation of the world, the fall of man, and his redemption by 
Christ. By choosing the Bible as his source he achieved a coherence of 
idea and story that no epic poet since Homer had managed.
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Milton’s ability to solve the problem of belief—can the poet and 
his audience simultaneously believe in ancient traditional stories and at 
the same time satisfy new canons of moral, philosophical, and historical 
truth?—was owing to the accomplishment of that whole cultural 
movement we call Christian Humanism. Its Christian elements rest on 
the achievements of Paul and Augustine in the understanding of scripture 
so as to preserve an amalgam of historical, moral, and philosophical 
truth.3 Because Milton based his epic on scriptural tradition, he moved 
even closer than Virgil did toward the solution of that other problem 
that confronts any epic poet who aspires to the cultural importance of a 
Homer. He comes closer than any other writer of literary epic to being a 
singer or performer, rather than an author. The intellectual grandeur and 
complexity of Milton’s poem are immense. In English narrative poetry 
his aesthetic achievement is rivaled only by Chaucer and Spenser. And 
yet Milton did not, and could not, take credit for his traditional story 
in quite the same sense that most literary authors are entitled to. He 
pretends, in the conventional way, to be divinely inspired, as did Homer. 
Whether, like the Homeric singers, he composed his mighty song through 
the intellectual and aesthetic mastery of a great tradition or, as he may 
himself have believed, through a process more akin to divine inspiration 
and prophecy, his authorial role in the poem is more nearly limited than 
in other literary epics to the disposition of materials and the telling of 
the story rather than the invention of its matter.
What it really meant, then, for Milton to imitate Homer was to 
tell a traditional heroic story, familiar to his audience, in such a way as 
to conform to the philosophical and historical truths of his time. That 
he was able even to attempt such an accomplishment is a tribute to 
the coherence of the cultural tradition to which he and his fi t audience 
belonged. Furthermore, however, he had to fi nd some place for himself 
in the poem that would neither detract from its traditional character nor 
obscure the fact that its great intellectual and artistic achievements were 
uniquely his own. That he felt compelled to make a thing “unattempted 
yet in prose or rhyme” he states explicitly, and yet, as Samuel Johnson 
remarked, he disappointed later canons of taste by repeating matter too 
familiar to please. I hope I have shown some reason for believing that 
Milton intended to do exactly what Johnson blamed him for. 
What then was new about Paradise Lost, that had as yet
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been unattempted? Of many answers to the question I might begin with 
the remarkable extent to which he succeeded in bringing to his poem a 
cultural and intellectual richness that is everywhere related to his central 
theme, a modern (that is, seventeenth-century) human understanding of 
Christian myth, a justifi cation of the ways of God to man. This cultural 
richness I have already attributed to Milton’s humanistic education. 
It includes not only the traditional story of scripture and classical 
antiquity, but the theology, astronomy, natural history, and other forms 
of learning that in literate cultures tend to go their separate ways. One 
aspect of this Miltonic synthesis from which I have chosen to view his 
narrative art is its harmony of time. Let me return to the text for an 
example. In describing Adam’s shame after his amorous play with Eve 
and subsequent restless sleep, Milton writes:
To guilty shame he covered, but his robe 
Uncovered more, so rose the Danite strong 
Herculean Sampson from the harlot-lap 
Of Philistine Dalilah, and waked
Shorn of his strength. (9.1058-62)
Adam wants to hide, to “live savage, in some glade obscured” and 
proposes that they
   . . . devise
What best may for the present serve to hide 
The parts of each from other, that seem most 
To shame obnoxious, and unseemliest seen,
Some tree whose broad smooth leaves together sewed, 
And girded on our loins, may cover round 
Those middle parts. (9.1091-97)
In the woods
   . . . they chose
The fi g-tree, not that kind for fruit renowned, 
But such as at this day to Indians known 
In Malabar or Decan spreads her arms 
Branching so broad and long, that in the ground 
The bended twigs take root, and daughters grow 
About the mother tree, a pillard shade 
High overarched, and echoing walks between; 
There oft the Indian herdsman shunning heat 
Shelters in cool, and tends his pasturing herds
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At loop-holes cut through thickest shade: those leaves 
They gathered, broad as Amazonian targe,
And with what skill they had, together sewed, 
To gird their waist, vain covering if to hide
Their guilt and dreaded shame; O how unlike 
To that fi rst naked glory. Such of late
Columbus found the American so girt
With feathered cincture, naked else and wild
Among the trees on isles and woody shores.
(9.1100-18)
Leaving aside the psychological response to guilt and shame, the 
range of reference here is remarkable and all remarkably appropriate. 
Hercules and Sampson are confl ated from their separate cultures as 
types of Adam. The fi g-leaf of scripture is preserved but explicitly 
related to the tree that “at this day” (that is, August 1667) bends down 
to hide the primitive Indian, in contrast to the upright tree and innocent 
unfallen Adam. The leaves themselves are compared to the shields of 
the Amazon warriors in classical legend, to suggest the hostility of the 
sexes resulting from the fall. The fi nished garments are contrasted, in 
the kind of narrator’s guiding aside to which I referred earlier, with the 
naked glory of the newly created Adam and Eve. Then back again to 
modern times and the savage Americans discovered by Columbus. In 
commenting on the catalog of fallen angels, I mentioned that the poem’s 
plot moves with glacial slowness. Like a glacier it inches forward along 
a huge front. But the telling of the story synthesizes a new poetic and 
intellectual whole out of the cultural and historical materials whose 
very vastness and diversity and hidden signifi cance are themselves a 
consequence of the fall.
Reading the poem, therefore, mitigates for us the consequences 
of the fall, as the cloudy metaphoric relationships between signs and their 
signifi cance are made intelligible, with something like a prelapsarian 
clarity. Reminded continuously of our place in history and of its temporal 
relationships to other times and other cultures, the reader is nevertheless 
afforded a vision which reconciles human with sacred time, the aevum 
of medieval philosophy.
The role of the poet in this is that of a Christian visionary whose 
imagination experiences simultaneously both historical time and a divine 
spirit in which all times are one. If his vision lifts us up to Heaven, it 
also brings Heaven down to earth. Nowhere else that I know of is the 
story of the fall told with real human
 HARMONY OF TIME IN PARADISE LOST 271
characters as they are understood by modern man. Nor is such great 
human love in any earlier version of the story celebrated as both the 
chief joy of man’s unfallen condition and also the reason for Adam’s fall. 
Eve in earlier versions of the story is at best only half of man. Here she 
is a whole human being, without whose company Adam cannot imagine 
himself happy. Adam’s action in following Eve to death is analogous 
to Christ’s. It is an entirely understandable human gesture which leads 
us to a greater understanding of the Son’s divine love. Because on this 
human level the poem still appeals to us—it is a form of “science fi ction” 
in which normal human beings are put in a context we have never 
experienced—the reader’s imaginative experience constitutes the last 
level of time. “Yes, that is how I might feel in similar circumstances,” 
we say, “it rings true, no matter how long ago it may have happened.” 
University of Virginia 
Notes
1Citations of Paradise Lost are made to Fowler 1971.
2By “surface” realism I refer to Auerbach’s point that nothing of significance in 
Homer is to be inferred from some “deeper,” implied, “inner” experience of the characters. 
Even events long in the past, such as the wound that left Odysseus’ scar, are brought to the 
center of a continuous narrative present. It is tempting, of course, to associate this feature 
of Homeric narrative with what Father Ong and others have observed of the “primary oral 
mentality” in general, that it exists only in the present, unable to distinguish stages of the past 
from a generalized ideal. I am indebted for this suggestion to Thomas J. Farrell.
3For a comprehensive description of the synthesis of pagan and Christian ideas and 
imagery in the literature of the Renaissance, see Allen 1970:espec. pp. 289-96 on Milton.
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